Discretion of local bureaucrat and the firm′s cost of rent-seeking
XU Lei
Abstract：In this paper, a mathematical model used to analysis the effects of the local officials discretion on rent-seeking cost of the firms and the social welfare.We also analysis the officials′preference, control of the microeconomic level, efficiency of entrepreneurial behavior, entrepreneurs comprehension of institution environ-ment and industry background, etc, and we find that to reduce rent-seeking behavior, improve enterprise pro-duction enthusiasm, improve the social welfare level should improve the achievements in the official promotion decision role, we will intensify reform of administrative examination and approval, making power officials listing to reduce unnecessary intervention in the market, at the same time improve the transparency of the government behavior.
Keywords：bureaucratdiscretionrent-seeking
Publication Date：2015-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：7( 161-167 )