Research on the Incentive Mechanism of Public Hospital Salary System Reform Based on the Principal-agent Theory
Liu Xuezhen
Zhou Dian
Zhao Wanying
Abstract：Objective To explore and analyze the incentive changes before and after the implementation of the annual salary system in public hospitals to provide guidance for the implementation.Methods Using the principal-agent theory,construct the structure and model of government,hospitals and doctors,and analyze the salary incentive before and after the implementation of the annual salary system.Results Former doctors"seek profit"and hospital"income orientation"conflict with the government public welfare goals;after implementation,doctors transfer"public welfare"and hospital and government goals seek"public welfare coordination",but there are also new problems such as insufficient incentives.Conclusion If public hospitals successfully implement the annual salary system,they should adopt fine parameter design,supporting system and dynamic equilibrium mechanism.
Keywords：principal-agent theorypublic hospitalsalary system reform
Publication Date：2025-06-05
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：5( 16-20 )