Study on the Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Telemedicine under the Dynamic Medical Insurance Co-payment Ratio
Wang Xule
Liu Wei
Wang Xuguang
Zhu Chenlong
Hu Yanli
Abstract：Objective:It introduces the dynamic medical insurance copayment ratio into the tripartite evolutionary game framework of"government subsidies,hospital construction,patient adoption".An evolutionary game model is constructed to evaluate the impact of the"subsidy-copayment-regulation"policy mix on system equilibrium convergence.Methods:Based on replicator dynamics and data from Sample Hospital,MATLAB R2023b software simulations and sensitivity analyses were conducted.Results:The system converges to(1,1,1)only when three conditions are simultaneously satisfied:the government's welfare increment exceeds expenditures,hospitals'net returns from telemedicine surpass those of traditional services,and patients'net utility is greater than their copayment cost.Among single policy tools,dynamic adjustment of the copayment ratio exerts the most significant effect on convergence speed.Among combined schemes,the"moderate subsidy+moderate copayment+moderate regulation"configuration achieves the best performance.Conclusion:A tripartite policy framework of"fiscal guidance,insurance adjustment,regulatory support"should be established,with particular emphasis on the dynamic adjustment of the copayment ratio.Phased policy optimization is recommended to enhance the efficiency and adaptability of telemedicine promotion,thereby providing empirical evidence for policy design.
Keywords：dynamic health insurance copayment ratiotelemedicineevolutionary game
Publication Date：2026-02-05
Online Publishing Date：2026-03-16(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：6( 13-18 )