Hospital Professional Position and Quality Competition under Medical Payment Method Reform
Wu Yaping
Li Sanxi
Abstract：Objective:To study the difference in the choice of professional position and quality investment before and after the payment reform of Diagnosis Related Group(DRG)and Diagnosis Intervention Packet(DIP),and analyze the theoretical mechanism and realization path of the promotion of graded diagnosis and treatment from payment method reform.Methods:Applying the theory of industrial organization in economic theory,a model of location-quality competition is established.Results:The payment reform of DRG and DIP provides incentive to other level hospitals that compete with tertiary grade A hospital to attract more patients through enhancing quality investment,and meanwhile to mitigate the quality competition through differentiated development in professional position.Conclusion:Appropriately designing the DRG and DIP,hospitals'quality investment will be higher and the functional positions will be closer to the social optimum than before the reform,which helps promote the implementation of graded diagnosis and treatment.
Keywords：medical insurance payment method reformhospital professional positionhospital quality competition
Publication Date：2025-12-05
Online Publishing Date：2026-01-05(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：4( 24-27 )