Analysis on the Effect of the Long-Term Care Insurance System on Health Care Expenditure

Hu Fang; Yang Yurui; Zhang Hao

Abstract：Objective:To explore the influence mechanism of long-term care insurance system on medical expenses,take the pilot model of Nanning City as a sample,and analyze the strategic interaction of multi-party subjects in the implementation of the policy,so as to provide a decision-making basis for the improvement of the design of the long-term care insurance system Methods:A tripartite evolutionary game Nanning model of"government-healthcare institutions-disabled families"is constructed in to explore the game equilibrium and the evolution trend,and numerical simulation is carried out by Matlab Software.Results:The stabilization strategy of the system is(0,1,1),reperring"loose regulation by the government,active cooperation by healthcare institutions,and support by disabled families".The government is the most important subject of the three-party game system,the"supportive"strategy of disabled families is relatively stable,and the sensitivity of healthcare organizations to government punishment is much larger than the sensitivity to rewards.Conclusion:The strategies of the three-party game are influenced by a variety of factors.The supervision strength of Nanning government is influenced by the cost of human and material resources;the law-abiding cooperative behavior of healthcare institutions is mainly influenced by the strength of government fines;the supportive behavior of disabled families is influenced by the government's incentive policy and the rent-seeking behavior of healthcare institutions.When promoting the LTC insurance system,it is recommended to improve the government regulatory mechanism,optimize the rewards and punishments of healthcare institutions,and enhance the willingness of disabled families to participate through economic incentives to effectively control medical expenses.