Research on the Evolutionary Game Strategy of Family Doctor Contract Service System from the Perspective of Govern-ment Participation
Liu Hui
Wang Qiaoli
Yu Jun
Abstract：Objective:To explore how government departments can mobilize the enthusiasm of family doctors and residents to fulfill their obligations,and under what circumstances the three parties in the game will reach a stable state of government"encouragement",family doctors"effort",and residents"signing contracts".Methods:It constructs a three party evolutionary game model using evolutionary game theory,and conducts numerical simulations on the model using Matlab2022a Software to analyze its strategy choices under different conditions.Results:The key factors affecting the choice of the three party strategy in the game include government regulatory costs,policy subsidies,health benefits and economic costs of residents signing contracts.Conclusion:There is an optimal subsidy range for government financial subsidies,and residents'strategic choices are influenced by health benefits and economic costs.Changes in government supervision costs affect the strategic choices of family doctors.Measures such as formulating reasonable policy subsidy schemes,controlling transaction costs,and improving supervision mechanisms can promote the transformation of game players towards"encouragement,effort,and signing".
Keywords：family doctor signing servicesthree party evolutionary gamenumerical simulation model
Publication Date：2025-03-05
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：5( 85-88,108 )