Government regulation and emission-reduction blocking effects under carbon market expansion
WANG Bo
ZHANG Jiayuan
YAN Xiaoqing
CHEN Haitao
LIU Guangchuan
Abstract：This paper constructs a multi-agent game model involving the government,power generation enterprises,and electricity-consuming enterprises to systematically reveal the interconnected logic among corporate green technology investment,product pricing,and carbon trading behaviors in the carbon market.It further analyzes the potential blockage effect that may arise during carbon market expansion and elucidates how emission intensity and technical parameters jointly shape the evolutionary mechanism of total system emissions.The research indicates that corporate green technology investment in the carbon market is significantly influenced by key parameters such as carbon emission intensity,green technology investment efficiency,and investment costs.Investment strategies display a clear strategic substitutability,meaning that an increase in green technology investment by one enterprise may inhibit the investment motivation of another,leading to free-riding behavior.Improvements in technological efficiency can mitigate this blockage effect.Corporate carbon trading behaviors exhibit structured variations with changes in emission intensity and investment costs,and trading strategies adjust according to their emission intensity and green technology investment characteristics.Numerical examples further demonstrate that the widening gap in emission intensity between upstream and downstream enterprises significantly influences the intensity of the blockage effect,thereby reshaping the evolutionary path of total system emissions.
Keywords：expansion of the carbon marketcap and tradegovernment regulationemission reduction decisionsgame theory
Publication Date：2026-01-28
Online Publishing Date：2026-03-19(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：10( 100-109 )