Research on tripartite evolutionary game of ecological governance in coal cities

LI Jing; CHANG Pu

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1002-9605.2025.10.014

Abstract：The Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China included"upholding and improving the ecological civilization system and promoting harmonious coexistence between humanity and nature"in the 13 items of"upholding and improving".The orderly construction of ecological civilization requires the collaborative operation of multiple roles.With the increasingly prominent ecological problems in coal cities,it is urgent to achieve effective ecological governance.By focusing on the three main parties of the government,enterprises,and the public,this paper uses the evolutionary game theory to deeply analyze their interactive behaviors and strategic dynamics in the ecological governance of coal cities,constructs an evolutionary game model of role collaboration,explores the decision-making motives and the trade-offs between benefits and costs of each party in different situations,and reveals the internal mechanism of the role of the collaboration among the three parties in improving the ecological environment of coal cities.The research results not only clarify the key roles of each subject in the process of ecological governance,but also provide a theoretical basis for formulating policies and strategies to promote the active cooperation among the three parties,with a view to promoting coal cities to move towards the path of sustainable development.