Coordination mechanism of government subsidies for the supply chain of charging piles under dealer fairness concern
GAO Lingxue
XUE Xiaofang
Abstract：In the context of government subsidies,this paper takes the private charging pile supply chain composed of charging pile manufacturers and charging pile dealers as the research object,uses the Stackelberg game to construct centralized decision-making,decentralized decision-making and dealer fairness concern decision-making models,analyzes the impact of dealers' fairness concern behavior on supply chain decision-making,and then introduces revenue sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain.The research shows that consumers' sensitivity to the quality level of charging piles has increased the wholesale price and selling price of products,but the market demand has not decreased due to the increase in price.The fairness concern behavior of charging pile dealers is beneficial to themselves and unfavorable to charging pile manufacturers,and the profits of the two increase and decrease,so that the total profit shows a slight downward trend;The development of revenue-sharing contracts can effectively coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto improvement in the profits of supply chain members.
Keywords：supply chaincoordination mechanismgovernment subsidiescharging pilefairness concernrevenue sharing contract
Publication Date：2025-10-28
Online Publishing Date：2025-12-02(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：9( 31-39 )