Blockchain technology,conventional policy tools and coal methane emission reduction:A tripartite stochastic evolutionary game
CHEN Feiyu
LI Zhuohang
XU Zihang
Abstract：Addressing methane emissions in the coal industry holds critical significance for achieving China's"Dual Carbon"goals and mitigating climate warming.This study integrates blockchain technology to construct a tripartite stochastic evolutionary game model involving the central government,local governments,and coal enterprises.Simulation software was employed to analyze the impact of key parameters on the evolutionary pathways of decision-making among stakeholders.The results indicate that under baseline scenarios,the central government's supervisory mechanisms demonstrate limited binding effects on local and corporate behaviors.The evolution rate toward the ideal steady state exhibits a significant positive correlation with the initial willingness of local governments and enterprises.Critical factors influencing system stability include the central government's penalty intensity,environmental protection funds,environmental taxation mechanisms,and the presence of government-enterprise collusion.While blockchain platforms serve as crucial catalysts in guiding local and corporate actions,excessive platform development levels may hinder the realization of optimal strategy combinations(supervision,regulation,emission reduction).Stochastic disturbances differentially affect stakeholder behaviors.Building on these findings,targeted policy recommendations are proposed to enhance China's coal methane governance framework.
Keywords：blockchain technologyconventional policy toolscoal methane emission reductionstochastic evolutionary game
Publication Date：2025-04-28
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：10( 56-65 )