Research on evolutionary game of new energy vehicle development under decliningsubsidies

LIU Xiaofan; LIU Manzhi; WANG Sai

Abstract：As one of the developing strategies since"The Twelfth Five-Year Plan",the sustainability of new energy vehicles has become an important factor affecting industrial upgrading and development.Will the decrease of government's subsidies affect the development of new energy vehicle industry?Taking new energy vehicle industry as the background,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between the government,manufacturer and consumer,and analyzes the evolutionary game process between manufacturer and consumer under the scenario of subsidies reduction.In addition,this paper collects the market production and sales volume and subsidy amount related to the new energy vehicle industry from 2018 to 2021,and carry out numerical simulation of the game model.The results show that the impact of government subsidies on manufacturer is higher than that on consumers.Battery life and charging convenience,as well as gasoline price,can influence consumers'purchasing decisions.Battery life and charging convenience cause the greater impact compared with other factors.The positive effect of rising gasoline price and the improvement of new energy technology on industrial development is higher than the negative effect caused by the withdrawal of government subsidies.The long-term development of the new energy vehicle industry not only depends on consumer demand,but also depends on manufacturers'continuous industrial upgrading and technological innovation.