Evolutionary game of dynamic safety regulation of miner violations in a coal mine trusteeship perspective

LI Jing; MAO Xiangning; WU You; ZHANG Jiangshi

Abstract：In order to effectively improve the miner violation behaviours under the coal mine trusteeship mode,a dynamic safety supervision evolution game model is established,comprising miners,safety trustees and enterprise entrusted parties,within the context of finite rationality.The model's stable equilibrium point is then analysed.The simulation is based on actual research data from a coal mine site and models the evolution of the game process under the condition of miners'violation behaviour,the three parties involved in the game of the coal mine trusteeship model,and the adjustment of the dynamic safety strategy.The results demonstrate that the interactions between the miners,the safety contractor and the entrusted party are subject to a dynamic evolutionary process.The incentives provided to the entrusted party are reasonable and effective,the safety contractor's inspections and supervision are meticulous and comprehensive,and all three parties should develop contingency strategies in a timely manner in accordance with the dynamic supervision mode.This approach is conducive to reducing the occurrence of miner violations and promoting the effective implementation of safety production in coal mine enterprises.The findings of the study indicate that the coal mine trusteeship model has the potential to facilitate the enhancement of safety production standards,the optimisation of the coal industry's configuration,and the rational distribution of coal resources.