Evolutionary game and empirical analysis of strategic response of coal-electricity industry chain under dual carbon target

GAO Jiaming; ZHANG Li

Abstract：Based on the basic national conditions of China's"rich coal and less oil"situation and the increasing domestic energy demand year by year,upstream and downstream enterprises in the coal power industry chain are steadily developing under the premise of energy conservation and emission reduction.Multiple factors need to be considered,among which government regulation and market power measurement of the industry chain can be the main influencing factors for enterprise strategic choices.In order to promote the active and stable implementation of the"dual carbon"goal in the coal power industry chain,while promoting the rapid development of the domestic economy,ensuring the low-carbon development of coal enterprises and the selection of new energy generation strategies for power enterprises.Based on the basic assumption and parameter setting of game theovy with the payment matrix,this article conducts a tripartite evolutionary game on the selection of low-carbon development strategies for coal and electricity companies under government regulation,and conducts empirical analysis on marketpower measurement based on the financial statements of coal and electricity listed companies in the electricity coal market.The results indicate that:① China's coal and power enterprises have a market power effect.Enterprises occupying the dominant electric coal market will reduce their technological innovation expenditures due to the"Schumpeter effect",while enterprises not occupying the advantage will choose to develop low-carbon production technologies and receive more government subsidies due to the"escape from competition effect".② Empirical analysis shows that the market power premiums of coal and power enterprises in the four stages from 2002 to 2021 are 1.339,1.058,0.906,and 1.148,respectively;2.086,1.279,1.896 and 1.367.The government forcefully regulates the market when the relative market power is too high,in order to eliminate the contradiction between coal and electricity and promote the integration process of coal and electricity.③ How to adjust the structure of China's future energy industry under the dual carbon goal,which not only requires the government to introduce strong measures to regulate the industry,but also needs to eliminate the contradiction between electricity and coal from within the coal power industry chain,so that the coal power enterprises are in a good cooperative and win-win environment and tend to choose stable energy-saving and emission reduction development strategies.