Analysis of carbon emission reduction investment decision of steel enterprises based on evolutionary game model under carbon tax and carbon trading mechanism
XUAN Wanyue
ZHU Yucheng
DING Rijia
ZHAI Jianqiao
WANG Ke
Abstract：Carbon taxation and carbon trading,as the government's primary measures to regulate carbon emission targets,will also significantly influence the carbon emission investment decisions of steel enterprises.This paper constructs an evolutionary game model for the carbon emission investment decisions of steel enterprises and explores the investment strategies for carbon emission reduction by enterprises under carbon taxation and carbon trading mechanisms.The results indicate that the efficiency and cost of carbon emission reduction investment,as well as free-rider benefits,significantly influence the strategic choices of steel enterprises.Both carbon taxation and carbon trading can reduce the probability of free-riding through carbon pricing,promoting coordinated emissions reduction by steel enterprises,but their effects on corporate profits differ.
Keywords：steel industrycarbon emission reduction investmentevolutionary gamecarbon tradingcarbon tax
Publication Date：2024-03-20
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：9( 73-81 )