Stackelberg game strategy for combined heat power unit considering locational marginal prices
FANG Yu-juan
WEI Wei
MEI Sheng-wei
LIU Feng
Abstract:Based on the concept of locational marginal electricity price (LMEP) in the electricity market, this paper proposes locational marginal heat price (LMHP). Then stackelberg game, whose participants are combined heat and power unit (CHP), electricity market and heat market, is established to solve the optimal bidding strategy of CHP in the combined heat and electricity market. Branch power flow (BPF) model is applied to obtain LMEPs. The power loss is considered in the district electricity network to calculate LMEPs accurately. Meanwhile, the heat loss is regarded in the solution of LMHPs. And the distribution law of LMHPs are analyzed based on the pipe heat loss functions. In this paper, a variable-step iterative optimization algorithm is introduced to solve the optimal generation and optimal bidding strategies for CHP, electricity market and heat market. Finally, a 6-node electrical 4-node heat network is presented in the case study to verify the stackelburg models and optimal bidding prices for CHPs.
Keywords:combined heat and electricity marketlocational marginal heat pricelocational marginal electricity priceStackelberg gamecombined heat and power unit
Publication Date:2018-01-01
Online Publishing Date:2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages:6( 682-687 )
Control Theory & Applications

Control Theory & Applications

PKUISTICEI
ISSN:1000-8152
Year, Vol.(Issue):2018,35(5)