Day-ahead strategic bidding for advanced adiabatic compressed air energy storage plant: a Stackelberg game approach
LI Rui
CHEN Lai-jun
MEI Sheng-wei
XUE Xiao-dai
Abstract：Advanced adiabatic compressed air energy storage (AA-CAES) can support the peak-shaving and the re-newable integration of power systems. At the early commercialization of energy storage facilities, the bidding strategy in the day-ahead electricity market is crucial for the economic operation of AA-CAES plants. We investigated the day-ahead bidding and offering strategies of the AA-CAES plant with a Stackelberg game theoretic approach based on an AA-CAES operation model considering the pressure dynamic. As the leader of the game, the AA-CAES owner submits electricity offers and bids regarding quantity and price, to the independent system operator, who acts as the follower and clears the electricity market to maximize social welfare. To solve the bi-level leader-follower bidding model efficiently, we lever-age the KKT optimality condition, and the binary expansion method to approximate and transform it as mixed-integer linear programming. The experiments on a modified IEEE-24 bus system demonstrated the energy arbitrage behavior of AA-CAES by purchasing the off-peak low-price electricity and selling to balance the peak-load with a higher price. The leader-follower game based bidding and offering strategies in the day-ahead electricity market can benefit the economic operation of the AA-CAES plant.
Keywords：Stackelberg gameadvanced adiabatic compressed air energy storageday-ahead electricity marketstrate-gic biddingmixed-integer linear programming
Publication Date：2018-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：6( 662-667 )