Stackelberg game scheduling for regional power grids
ZHAO Wen-hui
QI Yu
FAN Han-lu
Abstract：In view of the poor economic benefits of regional power grid consisting of wind, photovoltaics, energy storage system, thermal power plant and the emissions of traditional thermal power unit. In this paper, a Stackelberg Game Model that sets the grid operators and generators as decision makers in different positions is established. In the model, the step tariff set by grid operators and the dispatching control strategy of generators are optimized to realize the shaving peaks and filling valleys of superior power grid and to maximize the generators'economic and environmental benefits. In the model, the prices during various periods set by the grid operators are regarded as a principle party and the earnings of generator are regarded as a subordinate party. The principle party aims to reduce the emission of CO2and SO2, the subordinate party sets improving its own profits as a target. According to different operation modes of wind-pv-es hybrid system, the running period and supply-demand situation of the whole gird, the dispatching of distributed energy resource and traditional thermal power plant is optimized with consideration of the environmental benefits of thermal power units and the economic performance of the generator. Finally, the Stackelberg Game Model is simulated in the IEEE 10 system to verify the effectiveness of the model and whether the step tariff can allow the whole system to achieve both economic and environmental benefits.
Keywords：dispatching of regional gridstep tariffshaving peaks and filling valleysStackelberg game
Publication Date：2018-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：9( 644-652 )