Government Subsidy Mechanisms and Enterprise Behavior Preferences in Blockchain-Based Agricultural Assistance
GU Ling
NIE Jiajia
Abstract：This study investigates the alignment between government subsidy policies and enterprise behavior preferences in blockchain-based agricultural assistance.It aims to reveal the impact of different subsidy schemes on the decisions of self-interested and altruistic enterprises,thereby optimizing policy effectiveness and the sustainability of agricultural assistance.A tripartite Stackelberg game model involving the government,enterprises,and farmers is constructed to analyze equilibrium decisions under cost-based and sales-based subsidies across various scenarios.Sensitivity analysis and strategy comparisons are conducted to validate the results.Findings demonstrate that sales-based subsidies effectively incentivize self-interested enterprises to enhance traceability efforts,expand market scale,and significantly increase farmer income;in contrast,cost-based subsidies are more suitable for altruistic enterprises with high research and development costs,which can alleviate their financial pressure.Further analysis shows that when technology costs are low and consumer traceability preferences are high,sales-based subsidies achieve multi-win outcomes;otherwise,the system may fall into a"prisoner's dilemma".The study innovatively proposes a"policy-preference"matching mechanism,providing theoretical guidance and policy recommendations for designing targeted and differentiated blockchain-based agricultural subsidy policies.
Keywords：blockchain technologygovernment subsidiesenterprise behavior preferencesagricultural assistanceagricultural digitalization
Publication Date：2025-12-31
Online Publishing Date：2026-01-16(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：11( 149-158,171 )