Efficiency Analysis of Decentralized Supply Chains with Wholesale-price Contracts under Different Ownership Structures
HUANG Di
OUYANG Lianqun
Abstract：In a two-echelon supply chain that consists of a single manufacturer and a single retailer,the decision efficiency of push-and pull-based supply chains with wholesale-price contracts led by either the manufacturer or the retailer is studied,across four ownership structures:no cross-holding,retailer unilateral holding,manufacturer unilateral holding,and mutual cross-holding.Based on the newsvendor model,the first order optimality conditions for decentralized decisions are derived for both push and pull supply chains under each ownership structure.A comparative analysis of order quantities,wholesale prices and supply chain efficiency is conducted,and the impacts of manufacturer/retailer's shareholding ratio as well as product margin rate are further investigated.Results show that,for both push and pull supply chains,efficiency is highest when the contract leader holds shares in the follower,and lowest when the follower holds shares in the leader,with mutual cross-holding leading to intermediate efficiency.Furthermore,under the cases of no cross-holding or retailer unilateral holding,supply chain efficiency of the retailer-led pull configuration is higher than that of the manufacturer-led push configuration.In contrast,under the other two cases,the manufacturer-led push configuration becomes more efficient only when the manufacturer's shareholding ratio is relatively high and the product margin rate is relatively low.
Keywords：wholesale-price contractownership structureshareholding ratiodecentralized supply chainsupply chain efficiency
Publication Date：2025-12-31
Online Publishing Date：2026-01-16(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：8( 90-97 )