Financing and Pricing Decisions in A Supply Chain with Risk-aversion under Option Contract
ZOU Qingming
ZHANG Xue
LI Yuqiong
Abstract：In a two-level supply chain comprised of a capital-constrained retailer with risk-aversion and a supplier,this paper adopts the conditional value-at-risk(CVaR)to characterize the retailer risk-aversion and develop a game model.Under supplier credit guarantees,option pricing of the supplier and the optimal ordering decisions of the retailer are studied with two financing modes:bank loans and delayed payments.Furthermore,the choice of financing modes for the retailer is explored,while the impact of retailer risk-aversion degrees and financing interest rates on equilibrium decisions is analyzed.Results show that the retailer risk-aversion degree affects its financing choice.If the risk-aversion coefficient is below a certain threshold,the retailer prefers partial credit loans,whereas a higher coefficient leads to the choice of delayed payments.The optimal option prices and ordering quantities increase with the rise of the risk-aversion coefficient under both financing modes.The CVaR of the retailer decreases with the increase of the bank loan interest rate but is independent of delayed payment interest rates.In addition,the retailer risk-aversion must be within a certain range,otherwise,the supply chain operation cannot be sustainable.Finally,the theoretical results are verified by numerical analysis.
Keywords：risk-aversionoption contractcredit guaranteefinancing decisionpricing decisions
Publication Date：2025-10-30
Online Publishing Date：2025-11-19(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：12( 102-113 )