Airline Supply Chain Competitive Coordination with Strategic Passenger Behavior
ZOU Liuxin
LI Hao
TAN Meirong
Abstract：The intermediary agent, which is replaced by possible direct selling, is only assumed to be a follower in the airline supply chain in previous literature. A study is conducted into the competitive supply chain model of two flights in which the revenue sharing proportion is decided by the intermediary agent in the oversupplied competitive market environment with strategic passengers. A competitive game model of two flights is introduced. The revenue of the airline and intermediary agent and the revenue sharing proportion are obtained. The effectiveness of this supply chain is analyzed. Finally, it is found that this model is favorable for airlines when the passenger′s buying preferences are small. This model is found superior to the direct selling model from the perspective of revenue.
Keywords：revenue sharing contractstrategy passengerscompetitionintermediary agentoversupply
Publication Date：2017-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：8( 101-107,115 )