An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Regulation of Medical Rent-Seeking Behavior Considering Future Cost
CHEN Hairong
LI Xiaoli
XIE Tian
LI Congdong
Abstract：In order to analyze the influence of future cost on the behaviors of doctor and supervision department, an evolutionary game model between the government supervision department and the doctor is constructed considering future cost. Research shows that, in the case of not considering future cost and the supervision strategy not being chosen because the supervision cost of government supervision department is greater than the supervision benefit, it may eventually evolve into the stable state of the doctor choosing rent-seeking because of insufficient punishment. When the future cost is considered and its transformation reaches a certain level, it can restrict doctor's rent-seeking behavior to a certain extent. Therefore, on the basis of establishing appropriate regulation and penalty mechanisms, the government should also strengthen the management of the mobile market, reputation files and license of doctors to restrain doctors' behavior and protect the interests of patients.
Keywords：rent-seekingevolutionary gamegovernment regulationfuture cost
Publication Date：2017-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：7( 89-94,105 )