A Design of LPG Enterprise Agent Selling Mechanism with Asymmetric Information
JI Guang
HU Mingmao
QI Ershi
LI Jianguo
Abstract：A mechanism for LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) enterprise agent selling with asymmetric information is designed and analyzed. A principal-agent model is established to maximize the profit of the LPG enterprise, and the salve volume function and the transfer payment can be obtained through variational method after analyzing the objective function, the incentive compatibility constraint and the participation constraint. The sales volume and the transfer payment are increasing with the increase of the service level, while the selling agent can only obtain the maximum profit when he/she reports the true service level. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.
Keywords：mechanism designprincipal-agentLPG enterpriseagent selling
Publication Date：2017-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：7( 7-13 )