Analysis of an Evolutionary Game under Municipal Solid Waste Incineration Power Generation Based on System Dynamics
DAI Feng
DAI Wei
Abstract：Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, an evolutionary game model is proposed to analyze the decision among the central government, local government and MSW incineration power enterprises in waste disposing process while trying to reduce the environment pollution caused by municipal solid waste (MSW) incineration with electricity generation and promote MSW incineration power enterprises to dispose the waste in a green process. System dynamics is applied to analyze the stability of three stakeholders and identify equilibrium solutions. The simulation results show that the strategy selections of the three stakeholders fluctuate repeatedly, which indicates that the evolutionary stable strategy does not exist among the stakeholders. Therefore, dynamic penalty and dynamic reward are proposed to control the fluctuations. According to the sensitivity analysis, the simulation results indicate that the dynamic penalty can effectively restrain the fluctuations and make stakeholders more stable. Furthermore, compared with raising local government maximum penalty standard, raising the enterprise maximum penalty standard can not only restrain the fluctuations effectively but also present an ideal evolutionary stable strategy in which the probability of MSW incineration power enterprises to increase their probability to dispose waste in green process is closed to 1.
Keywords：municipal solid waste managementevolutionary gameevolutionary stable strategysystem dynamicsreplicator dynamics
Publication Date：2017-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：11( 1-11 )