Coordination Mechanism in a Retailer-led Supply Chain Considering Value-added Logistics Service Based on an Option Contract
FENG Ying
WU Qian
YU Yunlong
Abstract：The system operates under a mode in which the retailer acts as a Stackelberg leader while the manufacturer, the follower, is responsible for the transportation. Considering the value-added logistics service, a two-stage Stackelberg game model is developed under the situation that the logistics service in-fluences the market demand. Research shows that the manufacturer′s production and logistics service level in decentralized system are lower than the corresponding results in the centralized one. Then, an option contract and a logistics service cost sharing contract are introduced into the system which can coordinate the system effectively. Finally, the feasibility of the above contract combination is verified by a numerical example, with changes of option price, initial ordering quantity and expected profit with respect to the lo-gistics service cost sharing coefficient all analyzed.
Keywords：supply chain managementoption contract coordinationStackelberg gamevalue-added lo-gistics service
Publication Date：2016-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：6( 33-38 )