Coordination of Fresh Agricultural Supply Chain with Fairness Preference under Random Wastage
ZHANG Xu
ZHANG Qing
Abstract：The manufacturer′s fairness preference in the fresh agricultural supply chain is included in the research perspective. Based on the consideration of the effective supply and deterioration randomness of the fresh agricultural product, by constructing the Stackelberg game model, the influence of the manufacturer′s fairness preference in the operation of the fresh agricultural supply chain is analyzed and the coordination mechanism based on"risk-sharing&revenue-sharing" is designed. The research indicates that, in the de-centralized decision-making, the different values of manufacturer′s fairness perception coefficient and un-fairness aversion coefficient will exert different influences on the operation of fresh agricultural supply chain, and the sensitive degree of optimal decisions and profits of the fresh agricultural product supply chain to the fairness preference is different from the corresponding non-perishable product supply chain;when the contract parameter satisfies the certain conditions, the designed coordination mechanism can not only realize the perfect win-win and coordination of the fresh agricultural supply chain, but also eliminate the fairness preference of the manufacturer.
Keywords：fresh agricultural productfairness preferencerandom wastagesupply chain coordination
Publication Date：2016-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：10( 23-32 )