Competitive Strategies of Software Vendors Based on Stackelberg Game:SaaS vs.SWS
Guo Hai-ling
Yan Jian-yuan
Abstract：In order to clarify the effects of customer′s behavior about the stored data-sensitive, the switc-hing cost, the network externality, the product differentiation between SaaS( software as a service) and SWS ( shrink-wrap sofftware ) on the competitive strategies of software vendors, a competitive model be-tween SaaS vendor and SWS vendor based on stackelberg game is constructed from the perspective of con-sumer utility.A comparative statics analysis is presented to show how changes in exogenous variables affect the equilibrium solution.The results show that the proportion of stored data-sensitive customer, switching cost, customer′s implementation cost of SaaS, the intension of network externality of the two parities have a negative effect on SaaS vendor, while the first two exogenous variables have a positive effect on SWS. But as the role of customer′s implementation cost differentiation between SaaS and SWS and the intension of network externality of SWS on the profits of SWS will be subject to a cutoff value of switching cost, it is proposed that SWS vendor can not blindly decrease the implementation cost or increase the intension of net-work externality.
Keywords：switching costnetwork externalitydata-sensitivesoftware as a service( SaaS)shrink-wrap software ( SWS)
Publication Date：2015-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：7( 9-15 )