Contract and Game Models of Green Supply Chain with Risk-averse Retailer
Jiang Shi-ying
Ma Chun-yan
Abstract：Based on a two-stage green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer , considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness , consumer preferences and other factors , the centralized decision-making game models and manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model are established . Comparing the two game models , interaction of product greenness , wholesale prices , product prices and risk aversion and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also discussed .Finally, the reve-nue sharing contract is used to coordinate the green supply chain .Results:In a centralized decision-mak-ing model, the retailer's profit per unit and gross profit of products are zero;in the manufacturer-led Stack-elberg game model , product price will be gradually reduced along with retailers improving the degree of risk aversion;the transfer price in the manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model is greater than that in cen-tralized decision-making model; and there are revenue sharing coefficients so that the manufacturer-led green supply chain and the retailer-led green supply chain can be coordinated.
Keywords：risk aversiongreen supply chainproduct greennessgame modelsrevenue sharing con-tract
Publication Date：2015-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：6( 30-35 )