Coordination Contract of Seller′s Consumption Credit Considering Demand Mutual Shifting
Jing You-guo
Xu Yang
Yang Lu
Abstract：To study the rate pricing strategy and coordination mechanism of a single retailer and bank in the seller′s consumption credit on the condition that mutual shifts exist between credit consumption demand and cash consumption demand, Stackelberg game and revenue sharing contract research method are used, and decentralized decision-making model, centralized decision-making model and revenue sharing contract model are established.Conclusions are drawn: as demand loss coefficient rises, the bank′s rate and the retailer′s fee subsidy rise as well, while the fee rate paid by consumers falls;when retailer shares all the consumption credit revenue with the bank, Revenue sharing contract can achieve coordination of credit consumption system, but to achieve the perfect win-win coordination of the system, the bank needs to share part of the profit further with retailer.The simulation result shows that compared with decentralized decision-making and on the revenue sharing contract, the retailer′s profit reduces by 254.475 4, while the bank′s profit increases by 508.950 9.As the overall profit of the system increases by 254.475 4, the sys-tem benefits improve by 25.56%.
Keywords：seller′s consumption creditretailerbankdemand mutual shiftingdiscountcoordination
Publication Date：2015-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：7( 87-93 )