An Evolutionary Game Behavior Analysis among the Owner, the Contractor and the Public in Public Cultural Facilities Construction
Fan Xing-ju
Li Hai-tao
Chen Tong
Abstract：In order to overcome the interfacial microstructure contradiction caused by participation and in-terests discrepancy in the public cultural facilities construction and management and improve public cultur-al projects, a replicated dynamic method in evolutionary game theory is used to research the game relation-ship among the owner, the contractor and the public in public cultural facilities construction of our coun-try.By building an asymmetric tripartite game payoff matrix and analyzing replication dynamic equation, stable strategies under different conditions are derived.And three dimensional stereograms are given to show the influence that the variation of different parameters have on the strategic evolutionary trend and sta-bility.Results show that punishment strength on speculation, supervision cost and positive social incentive from the public affect the owner′s strategic choice; that anticipated punishment on speculation, and the public evaluation′s influence on the income affect the contractor′s strategic choice; and that whether the public cultural facilities supply meets the demand of the public affects the public′s strategic choice.In the end, strategic evolutionary trend stereograms under different conditions of three parties are combined to discuss the whole system′s game equilibrium states and find four groups of evolutionary stable strategies un-der different initial states of parameters.
Keywords：public cultural facilitiesthree partiesevolutionary gamereplication dynamicevolutionary stable strategy
Publication Date：2015-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：7( 80-86 )