A Behavioral Research of the Supply Chain Members Considering Information Leakage
Qiu Xiao-ping
Li Ying-bo
Abstract：In order to study information sharing between longitudinal members and horizontal members ′de-mand information leakage mechanism in a supply chain , a basic model consisting of one wholesaler and two competing retailers ( incumbent and entrant ) is established .The selling products are alternative and sub-ject to Bertrand competition .The differential pricing strategies of the two retailers are discussed under the conditions of information confidentiality and information leakage .The supplier′s choice mechanism is ana-lyzed .The results are as follows:Once the leakage occurs , the retailers will choose the separating equilib-rium price .The entrant can judge that the market is high when the incumbent′s price is higher than sepa-rating equilibrium price , and otherwise low in market demand .When the product pricing of the incumbent is at the minimum interval , the wholesaler will disclose the incumbent′s pricing information .
Keywords：screeningBertrand competitiondifferential pricinginformation leakagesupply chain
Publication Date：2014-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：8( 95-102 )