Misreporting Based on Asymmetric Information of Carbon Emission and Carbon Price in a Two-echelon Supply Chain
Yang Lei
Zheng Chen-shi
Abstract：Under asymmetric carbon information between upstream and downstream enterprises , in order to study the optimal misreporting decision , the Stackelberg game theory is adopted to discuss a two-echelon supply chain led by a manufacturer .A new production model is established based on carbon emission trading mechanism , and the optimal operation decisions of supply chain participants are obtained through the converse solution method .Besides , both the manufacturer and the retailer ’ s misreporting behavior and their influences on supply chain performance are discussed by a qualitative analysis .The results imply that there are big differences between carbon information misreporting and cost misreporting in supply chain . Manufacturer could seek his maximum profit whether he misreports or not .Compared with reflecting carbon information honestly , retailer prefers to under-report carbon information , and the misreporting of the retail-er will increase both the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer .However , the supply chain profits in misreporting situation are still lower than the optimal supply chain profits .The manufacturer can coordinate the supply chain with revenue-sharing contract , and the optimal revenue-sharing coefficient has positive correlation with retailer ’ s profits in misreporting situation .
Keywords：carbon emissioncarbon priceasymmetric informationmisreportingrevenue sharing contract
Publication Date：2014-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：7( 70-76 )