Service Cooperation Incentive Mechanism in a Dual-channel Supply Chain under Asymmetry Information
Chen Jun
He Yu-an
Lai Xin
Abstract：Aiming to investigate the incentive mechanism for different service levels provided by the manu-facturer in a dual-channel supply chain , the decision models of service cooperation are developed using the principal-agent theory on the assumption that the manufacturer′s service demand is achieved by the retail-er.Then, the optimal fixed payments and the optimal profit-sharing ratios are obtained under symmetric in-formation and asymmetric information , in addition to influence analysis of asymmetric information on coop-eration performance .The conclusion implies that the manufacturer′s profit decreases under asymmetric in-formation , the retailer′s profit remains the same even when lower service level is provided .However , the system performance of the supply chain decreases .
Keywords：supply chaindual-channelservice differentiationincentive mechanism
Publication Date：2014-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：6( 108-113 )