Stackelberg-Game-based Research on Buy-back Contract with Fairness Preference Considered
Qin Yan-hong
Yin Ya-xian
Wei Guang-xing
Abstract：A two-stage supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer is considered .A Stackelberg game model is established for such a supply chain by introducing fairness preference under a buy -back con-tract.Then, by a backward induction method , a research is conducted on how wholesale price is decided , whether buy-back contract can achieve coordination , and how fairness preference impacts the wholesale price .Results show that when the retailer and the supplier are playing Stackelberg game , a buy-back con-tract cannot coordinate the supply chain at all whether they consider fairness preference or not .The whole-sale price decreases as the retailer ’ s fairness preference increases , but it increases as the supplier ’ s fair-ness preference increases .
Keywords：fairness preferenceStackelberg gamebuy-back contractsupply chain coordination
Publication Date：2014-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：6( 85-90 )