Supply Chain Decisions and Coordination Considering Overconfident Behavior of the Retailer
Shi Kui-ran
Zhou Yang
Jiang Feng
Abstract：By incorporating overconfidence into the model , a two-echelon supply chain composed of one supplier and one overconfident retailer is investigated and their decision-making is analyzed .It is shown that if the retailer is overconfident , the supply chain can achieve coordination .However , supply chain co-ordination may be destroyed under the buy-back contract of the supplier .If the retailer gets the adverse market information , the buy-back contract would fail .On the contrary , if the retailer has favorable infor-mation, the supplier's profit would decrease with increase of the overconfidence degree .Furthermore, by introducing a revenue sharing contract into the model , the retailer's order quantity and the supplier's profit are greatly improved so as to achieve supply chain coordination .Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate and confirm the obtained results .
Keywords：supply chain coordinationoverconfidencebuy-back contract
Publication Date：2014-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：5( 46-50 )