Managerial Incentive and Optimal Technology Licensing of Firm in Considering Carbon Tax
Ma Hu-jie
Shi Kui-ran
Abstract：With the carbon tax and managerial incentive being imposed , the optimal selection problem of transfer of low carbon technology is discussed .It assumes that , in a duopoly market under managerial in-centive with regard to the carbon tax , one of the firms has a low-carbon technology .Based on Cournot competition model and bargaining model , fixed-fee licensing and royalty licensing are studied by using game theory .It shows that , if the innovation is drastic , the firm does not want to license its low carbon technology .If the innovation is non-drastic , whether the firm is willing to license its technology or not de-pends on how drastic the innovation is .Royalty licensing is always better than fixed-fee licensing for the innovative firm.There is a managerial incentive that affects the amount of the royalty .Further, different technology licensing influences the firm's equilibrium managerial incentive .
Keywords：carbon taxgame theoretical analysismanagerial incentive
Publication Date：2014-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：6( 120-125 )