Analysis of the complexity of dual oligopoly decision-making under brand perception
SHAO Junjie
ABUDUREHEMAN Kadeer
ZHAO Mingyu
YILIHAMU Tuersun
Abstract：Based on the limited rational decision-making of enterprises,this paper constructs a dynamic duopoly game model,taking into account the differences in consumers' willingness to pay for two brands.The brand perception parameter is introduced to study the dynamic evolution of enterprise games and explore the impact of changes in decision variables and exogenous variable parameters on model evolution.This paper conducts numerical simulations on the model and analyzes them with bifurcation diagrams,attractor graphs,and average profit graphs.Finally,by the delayed feedback control method,the chaotic state of the system was successfully controlled,and the market order can be stabilized.The research results show that excessively frequent price adjustments may lead to the system gradually falling into chaos.Brand perception is a comprehensive reflection of consumers' cognitive level regarding specific brand image,reputation,and conveyed values,playing an important role in corporate market competition.By the delayed feedback control method,it is possible to effectively guide chaotic states in price game models towards equilibrium points.
Keywords：bounded rationalityprice gamechaos controlbrand perception
Publication Date：2025-07-30
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-25(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：7( 22-28 )