Revenue sharing contracts of price-depended fuzzy demand
Abstract：With the supposition that any demand is fuzzy and price-depended, we discuss the cooperation between a supplier and a retailer who form a supply chain. By using the credibility theory, we not only explicate the Stackelberg game and the integration decision between the supplier and the retailer respectively, which results in the conclusion that the optimal solutions under the decentralized decision cannot optimize the supply chain, but also build the mathematic model based on the revenue sharing contract. We find that the coordinated mechanism and the centralized decision share the same optimal retail price while the two relevant coefficients, the wholesale price and the profit distribution, have a negative relation. We suggest the sufficient condition for the perfect coordination of the supply chain and a reasonable range of the profit distribution coefficient.
Keywords：fuzzy variablecredibility theoryrevenue sharingsupply chain coordination
Publication Date：2012-01-01
Online Publishing Date：2025-08-15(First online date of this platform, not the publication date of the document)
Pages：5( 26-30 )